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W. J. WAGNER
argue like that. Seen against that background, Ramus's glorification of a natural,
prescientific logic becomes manifest as the foundation of a movement that was
intellectually retrograde. A natural logic, like a natural law, is not automatically
self-validating. Insofar as these are purely descriptive concepts, they have only
the value of that degree of cultivation of nature which they describe. Ramus
was prepared to find nature but little cultivated, and to till the ground very little
more. The "Arts" world showed itself ready to go along with him for two
centuries at least, so far as logic was concerned; and it is remarkable that this
book, so rich in many kinds of erudition, should contrive to spare us even the
reduced technicalities of Ramus's syllogistic.
Ivo THOMAS
WORL.D LEGAL ORDER - POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES. By Wallace McClure. Chapel Hill: The University
of North Carolina Press, 1960. Pp. xvi, 366. $7.50.
This is an excellent book which has long been needed. In a persuasive and
well documented study, Mr. McClure points out not only the importance, but
also the necessity, of establishing a solid world order based on sound principles
of mutual respect of nations and obedience to international obligations if the
human race is to survive in this era of nuclear bombs, I.C.B.M.'s, and sput-
niks. Special emphasis is laid by the author on the situation in the United
States and the contribution which the American people should bring to the
cause of a better world.
The main thesis of the book is not new and has been stated many times
by enlightened jurists and leaders in foreign countries and here: there is a unity
of the legal system in the world. Just as municipal ordinances must conform
to state law, the latter cannot be repugnant to the federal legal order, and the
laws of every state, be it unitary or federal, should comply with the principles
of the law of nations. But many of the author's arguments are novel. His
analysis of many American and international cases is keen and deep, and his
recommendations and conclusions are worthy of utmost attention.
McClure first gives an interesting history of the American attitude toward
international treaties. He points out that the Framers were fully aware of the
international responsibilities of the United States, and never intended that
treaties be invalidated by courts on the ground of inconsistency with a later
statute. The Constitution itself directed the courts to enforce all treaties made
under the authority of the United States, without any exception. "To assert that
the Constitution . . . requires or permits national infidelity to higher-level law
is to do violence alike to the history and the hardly deniable mandate of that
admirable instrument."'
And, at the very beginning of the existence of the Union, the courts proper-
ly understood their duties in this respect. A treaty was given precedence over
a Virginia statute in the early case of Ware v. Hylton,2 and a few years later,
1. WAJAcE MCCLURE, WoRLD LEGAL ORDER 46 (1960).
2. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796).
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an act of Congress was held to have been invalidated by a treaty with France
in United States v. Schooner "Peggy."3
An "era of international responsibility" 4 followed, with the notable excep-
tion of the case of Foster and Elam v. Neilson.5 In that case the Supreme
Court denied effect to a treaty with Spain by understanding incorrectly that one
of its provisions required Congress to implement the treaty by a statute before it
could be enforced. Although in 1840 the Supreme Court expressly repudiated
the Foster case,8 the unfortunate theory of "non-self-executing treaties" was
born. This gave rise to the era of the "judicial violation of treaty obligation,"7
culminating in the "Chinese Exclusion Case," 8 in which "violent emotion re-
place[d reason," 9 and a congressional statute in derogation of a treaty with
China was given full effect by the Supreme Court. It is unfortunate that Con-
gress violated international obligations, and still worse, that the Court complied
by asserting that a treaty can "be repealed or modified at the pleasure of
Congress."10 On this point the author comments:
An ironic touch is in the language the Supreme Court of the United States
used about the Chinese laborers of the time, who were said to have "loose
notions . . . of the obligation of an oath." Can it be honestly maintained
that the Supreme Court of the United States itself possessed any but "loose
notions" of the obligation of a treaty?11
Such an approach seems to have founded the fallacious theory "of inalien-
able supremacy of national over international law - necessarily a denial of
international law - or else to be an assertion that national power is supreme
over law in international affairs." 12
In Justice Bradley's dissenting opinion in the Cherokee Tobacco case he sug-
gested that there should be a mitigation of the harshness of the doctrine that where
a treaty and an act of Congress are in conflict the more recent will be given effect.13
He asserted that a treaty should be invalidated only if Congress clearly indicated
its intention that it should be so; otherwise, provisions of a treaty anterior to
a statute and inconsistent with it should prevail. This approach was the fore-
runner of a more enlightened twentieth century view towards international
obligations of the United States. Thus, in Ex parte Toscano14 a federal district
court gave effect to the multilateral Hague Convention of 1907 as against the
contention that it was a "non-self-executing" treaty, implying that even though
Congress may regulate the method of giving effect to an international act, the
executive branch of the government should enforce it in absence of a statute
implementing it. The same should be said about the judicial branch.
3. United States v. Schooner "Peggy," 5 U.S. 103 (1801).
4. MCCLURE, op cit. supra note 1, at 67.
5. Foster and Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829).
6. In Pollard v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. 353 (1840).
7. MCCLURE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 71.
8. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
9. MCCLURE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 81.
10. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889).
11. MCCLURE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 83.
12. Id. at 93.
13. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616 (1871).
14. Ex parte Toscano, 208 F. 938 (1913).
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After a few other cases, the Supreme Court decided Cook v. United States,15
in which Bradley's dissent became good law, the Court saying that a "treaty
will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute un-
less such purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed." In another
well-reasoned case, Missouri v. Holland,16 the Court sustained the validity of
the Secretary of Agriculture regulations giving effect to a treaty with Canada
as against the contention that the subject matter of the treaty and of the regu-
lations was not delegated by the Constitution to the United States.
In those decisions the author sees a "tendency . . . toward a fade-out of
the anachronism of supposed legal equality of treaties and statutes and toward
the general acknowledgment of treaties as higher-level law."l 7 The author
emphasizes the principle of "pacta sunt servanda" which should be the basis
of every system of law, be it municipal or international, and asserts that
in declaring treaties, constitutionally valid statutes, and the Constitution
itself to be the "supreme law of the land," without specifying which should
be accounted first, the Constitution presupposes the primacy of treaties
should there be lack of harmony among the three kinds of law.1 8
McClure continues:
International acts are made jointly by two or more, sometimes by nearly
all, nations. Such acts cannot in the nature of things be superseded by an
act of one of the joint enactors . . . For a national constitution to assert
the supremacy of national legislation over international legislation would be
to assert an insupportable contradiction... 19
The author suggests that the "later in date" theory has no support either in
reason or in the Constitution, and that
to clarify their own constitutional-legal situation in this respect either by
decision of their courts reinterpreting the present constitutional provision
or by formal constitutional amendment proclaiming the higher level of treaties
over statutes would seem to be the appropriate first contribution by the
people of the United States - achievable wholly on their own motion -
toward the strengthening of world legal order.2 0
But treaties are not the only source of international obligations of the United
States. The great bulk of the law of nations is customary international law,
or the "common law of nations." 2 1 It has been recognized as "the law of the
land," but it, even more easily than treaties, may be abrogated by Congress.
The author points out how improper this approach is. The very fact that
the United States and other nations have an independent existence is in part
due to the fact that the rules of international law permit it. Therefore,
15. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
16. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920),
17. MCCLURE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 125.
18. Id. at 133.
19. Id. at 134.
20. Id. at 134.
21. Id. at 143.
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the national Constitution cannot in any realistic sense be final or supreme
so far as the legal government of the United States or any other nation-
state is concerned; but, accurately posited, the Constitution is an instru-
ment existing under the community law of nations ... 22
Mr. Justice Black's assertion that the United States is only "a creature of
the Constitution" 2 3 has a "fanciful nature." 2 4 McClure cites2 5 Brierly's state-
ment that the doctrine of sovereignty, as it came to be understood, developed
into a tool of "international anarchy." 26 The author could have expanded
on the disastrousness of this concept, used and misused not only by independent
countries, but also by members of federal states; 27 but he chose not to do so
probably because many other scholars have administered heavy blows to the
idea of sovereignty in recent years.28 As one of the mottoes of his study, how-
ever, McClure selected the words of the Preamble to the Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan of 1956 that "sovereignty . . . belongs to Allah
Almighty alone . . ." It can be added that the Pakistani Constitution (since
then repealed) was not the only one taking this stand.2 9
The United States Supreme Court explicitly recognized that the government
of this country derives certain powers directly from the law of nations, 3 0 which
at the end of the eighteenth century was "closely connected" with the con-
cept of natural law, constituting the background of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence.31 This approach was nothing new. Huig de Groot (Hugo Grotius),
the father of modern international law, used the law of nature in the beginning
of the seventeenth century "as a basis for the acceptance of a [new] law
governing the relations between states." 32 And the very title of the most im-
portant treatise by the great legal scholar Emmerich de Vattel, whose influence
on the members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was obvious, was
the following: Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle Appliquis d
la Conduite & aux affaires des Nations & des Souverains.ss In the course of
his monumental work, Vattel explained:
Under the conviction of the little reliance that can be placed upon the
natural obligations of political bodies and upon the mutual duties which
22. Id. at 177.
23. In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
24. MCCLURE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 178.
25. Ibid.
26. JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 46 (5th ed., Oxford, 1955).
27. W. J. WAGNER, THE FFDERAL STATES AND THEIR JUDICILRY - A COMPARATrVE
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION OF COURTS IN FEDERAL STATES 21-
25 (1959).
28. See, e.g., GEORGES SCELLE, TRAtTi ELiMENTArE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
(1944); MAREK KOROwicz, LA SOuvTERAiNETi DES ETATS ET L'AvENIR DU DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL (1945); PHILIP C. Jzssup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS (1949).
29. Sec. 1 of the Constitution of the Union of South Africa: "The people of the Union
acknowledge the sovereignty and guidance of Almighty God." See WAGNER, Op. Cit. supra
note 27, at 25.
30. MCCLURE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 182.
31. Id. at 178.
32. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 367 (1953), cited by
MCCLURE at 21.
33. THE LAw OF NATIONS, OR PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPLaD TO THE BE-
HAVIOR AND THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS (1758).
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their moral personality imposes upon them, the more prudent Nations seek
to obtain through treaties that help and those benefits which would be
secured to them by the natural law were that law not rendered ineffective
by the mischievous designs of dishonest statesmen.
3 4
The author himself states that "the unfolding concept of the universal law
of nature has been one of the most fruitful . . . ," for in international law more
than in any other field of law, "philosophers . . . have sought to clarify the
idea that an all-pervading natural law exists applicable to particular situations,
which all reasonable men will discover and admit a compulsion to abide by
as well as to utilize for the betterment of mankind." 3 5
From all these considerations it follows that "international law, not national
law must be enforced by the courts in cases wherein they cannot be reconciled,"
and that national courts should "find possible a decision that both treaties
and what clearly is international customary law must prevail over any kind
of national law and that for national governments the supreme constitution
is the supravening law of nations." 36
According to this approach, national constitutions must be treated as "in-
tegral parts of world legal order." 3 7 And happily, the modem basic laws of
some countries recognize the precedence of international law over their own
municipal legal system and are pledged to observe its mandates.3 8
In the light of these developments and the fact that a modern state, with
ever-increasing intercourse with other states, has a much larger area of matters
to regulate by international arrangements than previously, the efforts to amend
the United States Constitution on the pattern of the Bricker Amendment is
a sad example of the anachronistic state of mind of many American senators
and of part of public opinion. "There is insuperable difficulty in finding any
logic in the proposition that the law of one nation is superior to the law of
more than one." 39 And the suggestion that the treaty-making power is sub-
ject to the limitations of the Tenth Amendment and if so, should be exercised,
in some cases, only with consent by each of the fifty states, would result in
reducing the power to "incompetence." 4 0
It would signify a retrogression to the manner of thinking of some 200 years
ago, before the Fathers framed the Constitution. It would render the United
States a cripple in the field of international relations, and would mean to
the world that the country enters the path of isolationism and distrust of
international cooperation.41
In the last part of his book, McClure analyzes the legal structure of the
34. VATTEL, Book II, ch. XII, par. 1, cited by MCCLURE at 48.
35. MCCLURE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 19.
36. Id. at 191.
37. Id. at 192 (in the title of Chapter 8).
38. The French Constitution of 1946 (MCCLURE at 192) and of 1958 (id. at 131);
the Dutch Constitution, as amended in 1953 (id. at 193); Constitutions of some German
Laender (id. at 197); the Italian and Japanese Constitutions (id. at 198).
39. MCCLURE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 201.
40. Id. at 203.
41. Wagner on the Bricker Amendment, in THE BRICKER AMENDMENT - VIEWS
oF DEsS AND PROFESSORS OF LAw 104 (1957).
NATURAL LAW FORUM
world community. After a sketchy treatment of legislation in the community of
nations, 4 2 he passes to adjudication of disputes. After describing the essential
functions of the International Court of Justice, the author discusses the Niirn-
berg and other postwar trials by international tribunals and the European Eco-
nomic Community Court, the competence of which "includes the review of
decisions of national courts interpreting Community Treaties."' 43 A longer dis-
cussion is devoted to law enforcement in the community of nations, and particu-
larly to the Korean and the Suez crises.
In his final observations about the United Nations, McClure points out that
instead of being an instrument of national policy, the world organization should
be its objective. Unfortunately, some nations shortsightedly undermine some of
the most uncontroversial principles of organized international life. As far as
the United States is concerned, the most shocking example is the reservations
that the Senate deemed proper to impose upon the acceptance by the United
States of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.
They either lack purpose4 4 or discredit this country's fidelity to the rule of law
in international relations. The ill-famed reservation 4 5 providing that the United
States withdraws from the jurisdiction of the Court "disputes with regard to
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United
States of America as determined by the United States of America," is striking-
ly contrary to the "axiom of all law, emphatically of Anglo-American law, that
a litigant must 'not be the judge of his or its own case, . . . [and] is utter-
ly repugnant to . . . national jurisprudence [of the United States]." 4 6 This
attitude "may be compared to the assumption of a State of the United States
of the right to decide whether some litigation raised only state law questions,
or involved federal law, to the exclusion of the federal courts." 47
Another striking example of the pernicious American attitude in this matter
was a clear violation of an arbitration and conciliation treaty with Switzerland
by declining to submit a dispute to arbitration, in accordance with a Swiss
request in 1957, under the excuse that the matter was within the domestic
jurisdiction of the United States. 48 The author's hope that the approach of
the United States to international adjudication will change is substantiated by
some recent trends in public opinion, and particularly, President Eisenhower's
promise of a "reexamination of our own relation to the International Court
of Justice," 49 and Senator Humphrey's resolution to change the terms of the
United States accedence to the International Court.5 0
The failure of the United States to live up to what may be expected of the
leader of the free world may clearly be seen in the fact that we did not ratify
some apparently noncontroversial international conventions which were accepted
42. Op. cit. supra note 1, at 212-16.
43. Id. at 232.
44. Id. at 272.
45. The so-called "Connally Amendment."
46. MCCLURE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 274.
47. Wagner, Is a Compulsory Adjudication of International Legal Disputes Possible?, 47
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEw 27, 37 (1952).
48. MCCLURE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 278-81.
49. Id. at 282.
50. Id. at 283.
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by many other nations. One of these is the Convention on Privileges and Im-
munities, dealing with the diplomatic status of the Secretary-General and the
Assistant Secretaries-General of the United Nations, and with the rights of
all officials and employees of the Organization. 5 ' The fact that the seat of
the United Nations is in New York makes it clearly imperative that the United
States should do its best to facilitate the work of international employees. It should
be mentioned that difficulties in obtaining American visas for persons having
some lawful business in the United Nations, which are made by American
authorities on -the ground of "very doubtful needs of national security," were
"very far out of accord with a policy of upbuilding the United Nations" 52
and could hardly contribute to the increase of the prestige of the United States.
But the most scandalous failure of the United States is that of nonratifying
the Convention on Genocide, which is "defined as certain stated acts commited
with intent to destroy a national, ethical, racial, or religious group in whole
or in part."5 3 On this point, the author has the following comments:
It was the outstanding savagery of World War II; at the very least its
outlawry by enacted supranational law and at most its reduction and pre-
vention through punishment would seem one of the minimum prerequisites
of a satisfactory world legal order. Yet the people of the United States failed
to compel their Senate to make the wholly costless gesture of their partici-
pation in it, an omission symbolic of the shortsightedness of their policy
concerning the United Nations and of the fruitfulness of their contribution
if that policy were regenerated. 54
Why did this happen?
Although a representative of the Department of Justice testified at Senate
hearings that the crime of genocide . . . never.had been committed in
the United States . . . , hence, that the treaty would not result in any
kind of governmental action within the United States, certain persons have
chosen the view that it was an instrument for altering the balance of power
between the federal government and the governments of the states and
to oppose it as such . . .55
Passing to the role of the United States President with respect to the United
Nations, McClure has two interesting suggestions. One is that the President
should lead the United States delegation to the international organization, and
be present at some of its sessions, whenever it would be possible.5 6 This rec-
ommendation was made before the spectacular United Nations session in the
fall of 1960, which was attended by the heads of most of the nations. The
second suggestion is to include in the delegation two members of each house
of Congress,S7 so as to enable American legislators to participate in the process
of international legislation.
51. Id. at 285.
52. Id. at 290.
53. Id. at 291.
54. Id. at 292.
55. Id. at 291.
56. Id. at 296-297.
57. Id. at 299.
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Summing up, McClure restates which "United States politico-judicial doc-
trines become untenable - if, indeed, they ever possessed any validity either in
law or logic," 5 8 and recommends action that should be taken by the people
of the United States. 59 In the conclusion, entitled "Human Civilization and the
Law," the author points out that the last spectacular inventions have "revealed
humanity in new splendor and in new degradation."60 He goes on to say:
The sublime expression of the human intellect . . . is mocked by the un-
precedented brute-cruelty of the first utilization of atomic energy and by
the adolescent vanity and jealousy of men more concerned about the partic-
ular spot where the first man-made space explorer happened to be launched
than about appreciation of its magnificence as a human achievement.
Herein lies cause for somber reflection for the future, for such abuse of
man's achievement leaves no assurance that he will muster the wisdom to
use his new-found knowledge for the welfare of all peoples rather than for
all-inclusive genocide. 6 1
In this situation, the only hope for a better future of mankind is -to improve
and enforce international law, law being ... "an expression of human self-
control." 62 One of the most important functions of the law is "the protec-
tion of civilization." 63 And with the achievements of humanity we are enjoy-
ing, McClure hopes that man will be reasonable enough to avoid destruction.
It could be added that after both the First and the Second World War, two
distinct trends appeared in the life of the nations: one, to assure independence
of each nation with respect to any other single one; and another trend, to sub-
mit all nations to the authority and control of the international community.6 4
Even if this development may be arrested or even turned back in some areas
of the globe, it may be expected that in the long run it will progress towards
the final and absolute recognition of order in the life of nations. And this in-
ternational legal order
is significant only as part of a universal legal order which comprises also
all the national legal orders . . . the international legal order determines
the territorial, personal, and temporal spheres of validity of the national
legal orders, thus making possible the coexistence of a multitude of states
65
Unity of internal and international law was emphasized also by many other
legal scholars, among whom Scelle was outstanding. For him, both "dissolve
. .. in a unified Law of Society."6 6 In the light of these theories, the United
58. Id. at 294.
59. Id. at 305.
60. Id. at 309.
61. Ibid.
62. Id. at 310.
63. Id. at 325.
64. WAGNER, Las LIBERTiS DE L'AIr 163 (1948).
65. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 403 (1952), cited by MCCLURE
at 22.
66. SCELLE, PRfCIS DE DRorr DzS GENS: PSUNCIPES ET SYSTIEMATIQUE, I, 32ff. (1932-
34), cited by MCCLURE at 24.
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States doctrine of the "suprasupreme Constitution"6 7 is devoid of any logical
basis.
McClure's book should be read by legal scholars, politicians, students, and
particularly by judges, senators, and statesmen responsible for the conduct of
international affairs of the United States. The use of the book is facilitated by
a table of cases, a table of international legislation and constitutions and an
index, which is incomplete but helpful (8 pages). A 10-page bibliography is
also annexed.
W. J. WAGNER
67. MCCLURE, op cit. supra note 1, at 43.
PATERNS OF ETHICS IN AMERICA TODAY. Edited by F. Ernest Johnson. New
York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. Pp. 167. $3.00.
An outstanding problem in American pluralistic society is that those holding
varying philosophies make little effort to understand one another. The same
observation holds for the varying religions and theologies and the varying power
groups such as labor and farm and management. Of course, some of those in
one group will readily give answers for the deepest problems of any other group:
labor easily handles management's problems, and vice versa; and at the drop
of the hat either or both will show the farmer the way out of his bafflement.
But really to know another group's position and its strong points and its real
difficulties - this is uncommon.
Happily we have several instances of dissident groups coming together for
serious conference. The attempt is to intercommunicate and to understand, and
(we hope) at least then to allow for the other position. Most notable in this
regard is the "dialogue" being engaged in by the several faiths or religions, and
the most successful of these efforts to date, we believe, have been three: the
conference called by the Fund for the Republic under the title Religion in a
Free Society (published in paperback, 1958, by Meridian as Religion in America);
the interfaith meetings now for several years in the Boston area; and of course
the National Conference of Christians and Jews, formed in the first place to try
to overcome the misunderstanding- to say nothing of the lack of good will-
and the consequent intolerance so obvious in the 1928 political campaign. We
have much evidence that the "dialogue," if less crucially needed than a genera-
tion ago, is badly needed and will continue to be badly needed in American
society. In passing we remark that urban renewal and redevelopment programs
are going to depend absolutely on interfaith understanding and cooperation;
and these are going to be hard to secure.
Teamed with those three is the series of conferences that have been held over
several years at the Institute for Religious and Social Studies of the Jewish Theo-
logical Seminary of America. Patterns of Ethics consists of lectures given at the
Institute. In 1959 the Institute brought together leaders of various faiths who
spoke on moral norms as seen by the philosophy and theology each represented.
